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Abstract—Networked systems form the backbone of modern
society, underpinning critical infrastructures such as electricity,
water, transport and commerce, and other essential services (e.g.
information, entertainment and social networks). It is almost
inconceivable to contemplate a future without even more depen-
dence on them. Indeed, any unavailability of such critical systems
is – even for short periods – a rather bleak prospect. However,
due to their increasing size and complexity, they also require
some means of autonomic formation and self-organisation. This
paper identifies the design principles and open research issues in
the twin fields of self-organisation and resilience for networked
systems. In combination they offer the prospect of combating
threats and allowing essential services that run on networked
systems to continue operating satisfactorily. This will be achieved,
on the one hand, through the (self-)adaptation of networked
systems and, on the other, through structural and operational
resilience techniques to ensure that they can detect, defend
against, and ultimately withstand challenges.
Index Terms—system resilience, network resilience, self-
organisation, autonomic communications, programmable net-
works
I. INTRODUCTION
TODAY’S world has become strongly dependent on net-worked computer systems, more through evolution and
opportunism than through foresight and planning. The rapid
adoption of Internet technologies has been nothing short of
astounding [1] – a process that was accelerated by the advent
of the World Wide Web, building on the ubiquitous spread of
the Internet’s network infrastructure. The resulting networked
systems are now so common that many, especially in the
younger generation, forget (or do not know) what life was
like before their advent. Prominent examples of networked
systems include utility networks (e.g. Smart Grid), Industrial
Control Systems (ICS), the emerging Internet of Things (IoT),
Industry 4.0, Cloud Computing, 5G, and Smart Cities. In
these systems, the architecture is essentially that of a set of
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distributed services operating over a communications network,
where the services are characterised by the nature of the
application or enterprise (whether this is IoT, ICS, 5G, etc.).
As the ubiquity of networked systems has grown, so have
their speed and complexity, and their necessity for many social
processes – to the point that human management is inadequate
to the task of keeping the systems working. This has driven
the imperative towards self-organising systems – and also self-
managing, self-protecting, and other so-called “self-*” prop-
erties [2] – that allow the network (in the broadest sense) to
adapt its own organisation and behaviour in pursuit of service-
level goals. Self-organisation can operate in pursuit of many
different goals which may themselves be stated at a number of
levels. One may seek to improve (or maintain) performance in
the face of changing network conditions, or to integrate new
devices or access points, or to include new service variants.
From a user’s perspective, however, these technical issues can
be subsumed under a goal of resilience: the system continues
to work according to the user’s expectations regardless of
changes that may themselves be hidden anyway [3], [4].
It is these twin entwined concepts – self-organisation in
pursuit of resilience – that are our topic in this paper. We
define self-organisation as the techniques a system may use
to change its detailed structure and behaviour in response to
external stimuli (extrinsic challenges) or changes in require-
ments (intrinsic challenges), in order to maintain service levels
which may themselves be modified as part of the adaptive
process. The ability to change service levels is a crucial part
of this: some challenges are simply insurmountable, and lead
inevitably to user-visible degradation. We define resilience as
the ability of the system to avoid this extremity and continue
to provide acceptable service. The goal of this paper is to
identify the design principles and open research issues in
the combined fields of self-organisation and resilience for
networked systems.
The challenges to self-organisation and resilience are enor-
mous. Critical services can be subject to natural disasters,
third-party failures such as power outages, configuration and
other failures. The rise of cyberattacks adds a directed di-
mension to these challenges, and the range of recent attacks
(including Stuxnet [5], the Mirai botnet [6], and WannaCry
[7]) has led to a burgeoning cybersecurity industry that sup-
ports a huge scientific and engineering effort to prevent attacks,
develop mechanisms for ameliorating their effects, and provide
forensic support for later investigation [8]. The critical nature
of many networked systems and their increasingly intimate
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effects on the livelihoods (and indeed lives) of an increasing
number of people, is leading users to mandate specific levels
of resilience for certain applications [9], [10].
The remainder of this paper is organised as follows. Sec-
tion II presents the necessary background on the independent
research areas of self-organisation and systems resilience.
Section III discusses the interplay between self-organisation
and resilience in the design of network systems architectures.
Section IV outlines a number of open research challenges
covering technical aspects such as the role of intent-based
networking and network function virtualisation, and wider
considerations such as those relating to the human element and
the role of people in guaranteeing systems resilience. Finally,
Section V presents our concluding remarks.
II. BACKGROUND
Resilient self-organised networked systems research draws
on several domains. We organise our brief background review
around two themes: the modelling and provision of self-
organisation within networks and the additional technology
used to promote resilience.
A. Self-organisation
Self-organising systems have long been a subject of research
interest in computer science. The earliest example is possibly
due to Dijkstra, who studied self-stabilising systems that re-
turned to a predictable state after perturbation [11]. The name
of this paper – “Self-stabilizing systems in spite of distributed
control” [our emphasis] – foreshadowed the difficulties facing
anyone attempting to construct such systems.
The core challenge of self-stabilisation, and of self-
organisation in general, is that it is a global property: no
single component can determine whether or not the system
as a whole is in an acceptable state, especially in the pres-
ence of component or communication failure. Similar issues
occur throughout science: one example is the way in which
murmurations of starlings form and evolve as the integral of a
large number of individually local decision processes, with the
structure (flock) being stable even as components (birds) move
or drop out. It has proven possible [12] to develop surprisingly
simple algorithmic descriptions of these processes, and there
is now a significant class of biologically-inspired approaches
to self-organising systems.
Self-organisation is increasingly important as network com-
plexity increases. The clearest examples come from domains in
which there are frequent, spontaneous changes in device pop-
ulation, topology, services, and so on. Mobile ad hoc networks
(MANETs) were once limited to tactical military systems
but now are essential in enabling Internet of Things (IoT)
systems and wireless sensor networks. They are also found in
home mesh networks and vehicular networks (VANETs). We
repeatedly see that in many cases niche techniques have main-
streamed, leading to a more complex but more independent
and self-organising overall architecture. The key observation
is that management is treated as a local (or at least non-global)
task that is the responsibility of the nodes themselves, rather
than being imposed from outside.
An important phenomenon for our current purposes con-
cerns the behaviour of networks under attack. These are often
studied within the framework of percolation theory: given a
network and an attack that removes some proportion of nodes
and/or edges, is there still a “giant component” that keeps a
large fraction of nodes connected? The simplest of such attacks
removes nodes or edges at random, and might more accurately
be described as modelling typical failures; more structured
attacks target nodes with particular properties, such as the
high-degree hubs or the low-degree bridges between otherwise
sparsely-connected components. Internet core routers [13]
exhibit a powerlaw topology, giving the network a degree of
“natural” or topological resilience to failure which nonetheless
does not necessarily extend to resilience against informed and
targeted attacks.
Topological techniques can be regarded as giving “spatial”
resilience, in the sense that it is available statically whenever
a challenge arises. This is perhaps the most stable form
of resilience, since it depends only on the system’s overall
features. It is also possible to apply more dynamic techniques,
either by adapting the network (perhaps activating additional
links) or by adapting its behaviour (perhaps providing new
service instances or changed protocols or security stances): a
more “temporal” form of resilience that can use less resources
under normal circumstances and provide a more flexible array
of responses [14].
Within the systems community, the most influential intellec-
tual currents have undoubtedly been provided by research into
autonomic computing defined by Kephart and Chess [15] as
“computing systems that can manage themselves given high-
level objectives from administrators”. Autonomic computing
research has explored systems that are self-managing, self-
configuring, self-optimising, and possessing a range of other
self-* properties. The agenda has been structured around two
parallel strands, one aimed at creating the proper ab initio
architectures for self-* behaviours, and another aiming at
adding self-* management behaviours to collections of existing
services. Alongside autonomic computing has been a parallel
effort in autonomic communications [2] [16] looking explicitly
at adding self-* properties to networks. For both computing
and communications, much of the work has been centred
around a closed-loop control architecture – variously referred
to as Monitor-Analyse-Plan-Execute over shared Knowledge
(MAPE-K) or Collect-Analyse-Decide-Act – that generalise
standard control-theoretic approaches by using various other
mathematical formalisms, often adding flexibility at the ex-
pense of decidability.
In autonomic networks the underlying idea is that network
structures can form in an autonomous fashion by enabling
network nodes to parameterise and operate independently
using sensing and environmental awareness, and adaptation
capabilities within the nodes and of protocols. Essentially au-
tonomous networks and their components should require little
or no direct intervention during set-up as well as runtime. They
learn and adapt to changes in the environment, while providing
a stable, reliable and secure communication infrastructure.
The autonomic approach arose in response to the concerns
of systems developers as well as network operators, and it
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is explicitly targeted at adding self-* properties to existing
systems rather than forcing the development of new systems
purely to address self-* questions – legacy software is, after
all, just software that has worked well for a long time. While
this may limit the functionality that can be developed, the
ability to add management functions (for example, by mining
server logs to trigger re-configurations) enormously reduces
the start-up cost of self-organisation.
B. Resilience
Resilience should now be considered a vital property of
systems and networks. In [17] resilience is defined as a concept
associated with telecommunications systems and supporting
resources and defines their ability to resist the loss of capacity
due to failures or foreseen overload. The goal is to optimize
the availability and quality of service of a system and enable
it to return to a previous normal condition after a challenge
subsided. The emphasis in [18] is on fault management and
recovery methods, and how Quality of Resilience can be
achieved through resilience differentiated services. We define
resilience as the ability of a system or network to maintain
acceptable levels of operation in the face of challenges, includ-
ing malicious attacks, operational overload, misconfiguration,
and equipment failures. Hence, resilience management encom-
passes the traditional FCAPS (fault, configuration, accounting,
performance, and security) functionalities [19] and comprises
structural as well as wider context related considerations [18].
Concerns about the dependability and resilience of com-
puter systems date back to the earliest days of computing.
Within the networking context they, for instance, motivated
the early ARPANET design, resulting in the decision to use
connectionless paths in order to recover more easily from a
failed router [20]. However, it was recognised that basic fault-
tolerance is insufficient in the case of correlated failures (e.g.
due to an attack) and thus network survivability became an
important discipline for modern networks [21] (along with
architectural strategies to achieve survivability [21], [22]).
While fault-tolerance only requires redundancy in components
and paths, survivability requires diversity [4], in order for the
redundant part not to share the same fate as the failed com-
ponent. Another factor are active management and protection
elements that allow to detect the onset of challenges and com-
bat them through appropriate defence and mitigation action.
Challenge taxonomies [23] and also a resilience ontology [17]
are required to capture threats and challenges in appropriate
threat models on which resilient system and network design
can be based.
A more formalised and comprehensive view on network
resilience is presented in [4]. Cholda et al. [18] present a
detailed survey on resilience differentiation in the Internet that
also provides a detailed discussion on resilience assessment
frameworks. In essence these discussions capture the rela-
tionship between resilience related concepts and disciplines,
i.e. challenge-tolerance (including fault-tolerance, survivabil-
ity, disruption-tolerance, and traffic tolerance), trustworthiness
(including dependability, performability, and security), robust-
ness, and complexity. Furthermore, a set of principles grouped
as prerequisites, enablers, tradeoffs, and behaviours are defined
(Figure 1).
prerequisites tradeoffs enablers behaviour
service  
requirements
normal 
behaviour
threat and 
challenge models
metrics
heterogeneity
resource  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state  
management
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self-protection
translucency
multilevel
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   and autonomic
adaptable
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Figure 1. Relationship between prerequisites, enablers, tradeoffs, and be-
haviours of resilience
Among the key resilience enablers are redundancy, diver-
sity, and connectivity and association [24]. Redundancy refers
to adding additional resources to provide fault tolerance. This
principle can be employed across all system levels, including
hardware redundancy (i.e. additional hardware which is added
to system or system components to improve availability even
in the case of failure), path redundancy (i.e. the availability of
multiple alternative network paths between source and desti-
nation), and application redundancy (i.e. multiple application
instances that can carry out the same task). Diversity (in
addition to redundancy) provides survivability in cases where
redundant components share the same fate. This includes ge-
ographically diverse paths to survive large-scale disasters, and
the avoidance of "monocultures" in hardware and software,
e.g. to improve resistance to zero-day attacks. Connectivity
and association refers to disruption-tolerance in challenged
communication environments due to intermittent and episodic
connectivity, e.g. for wireless links, mobility, unpredictable
delay, and energy-constrained nodes. A key aspect is to be
able to communicate even when stable end-to-end paths are
not available.
Resilience in networks and systems has different viewpoints.
In [18] structural and guaranteed resilience differentiation
are distinguished. The former is concerned with structural
arrangements (specifically related to the recovery of different
connections) whereas the latter provides guarantees on the
level of resilience. We distinguish between Structural Re-
silience, which expresses the resilience of the network and
system infrastructures (i.e. the structural arrangements) and
the assessment of the resilience level they offer (e.g. [24]);
and Operational Resilience that specifies the level of active
resilience management capabilities within a system or network
that allow to actively defend, detect and mitigate against
threats.
An early application of adaptation for structural resilience
in the context of optical network restoration is a self-healing
network [25], in which a distributed algorithm restores a cut
fibre in an optical mesh network. Dynamic routing as is typical
in the Internet adapts to link and router failures; the ability
to provide and exploit geographic diversity across redundant
paths enables resilience to correlated failures from large-scale
disasters [26].
Well-defined resilience targets can be used to provide more
clear and tangible expressions of the desired resilience status
[3]. The goal on the one hand is to establish if and to what
extent structural resilience targets are met, i.e. if the levels of
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redundancy and diversity throughout the system are sufficient,
and also if connectivity can be upheld. On the other hand,
in the case of Operational Resilience a challenge analysis in
conjunction with a resilience estimator helps to determine if
specified resilience targets are being met. If this is not the
case appropriate resilience mechanisms have to be invoked to
counter or adapt to challenges in order to maintain a high-level
of resilience.
III. SELF-ORGANISATION AND RESILIENCE IN
NETWORKED SYSTEMS ARCHITECTURES
In this section we take a closer look at the need for
resilience and self-organisation, and how these can be realised
in networked systems architectures. We first look at the
requirements of key application use cases. Critical systems
form a major application domain in this context. Then we
present resilience principles and building blocks, and how self-
organisation and functional adaptation are leading us towards
networked systems resilience.
A. Critical Systems and Requirements
Many critical infrastructures are undergoing a process of
digitalisation, for reasons such as improved efficiency, re-
silience, and the support of new services. This is, for instance,
the case for energy systems that are being transformed into
Smart Grids to enable the integration of renewable energy
sources and stimulate the development of green energy ser-
vices [27]. The digitalisation depends heavily on communi-
cation networks, e.g. to enable telecontrol of field devices. A
wide range of networking technologies are being considered
for application in the Smart Grid, including LoRa to connect
low-powered distributed sensors and programmable networks
to support application-level requirements in the network.
This increased connectivity introduces new interdependen-
cies between networks and systems, and the potential for
cascading failures [28]. Previous research has sought to un-
derstand the properties of these interdependent networks, for
example, to determine the risks associated with the propaga-
tion of malicious software across networks, using percolation
theory [29]. With an understanding of the risks, e.g., knowl-
edge of Shared Risk Link Groups (SRLGs) [30] and critical
systems that facilitate cascading failures, infrastructures can
be designed to be structurally more resilient to failures and
cyber-attacks.
Unfortunately, digitalisation introduces new cybersecurity
vulnerabilities that can be exploited by increasingly sophis-
ticated threat actors [31]. Lately there have been high-profile
incidents that have shown the potential consequences of intro-
ducing digital components connected via wide-area communi-
cation networks to critical infrastructures. In the energy sector,
perhaps the most notable recent example of a cybersecurity
incident occurred in Ukraine in December 2015, resulting in
a power blackout [32].
IoT promises efficiencies and economic benefits by con-
necting masses of physical devices, including sensors and
actuators, to wide-area networks, in particular to the public
Internet. One of the major applications of future 5G networks
is providing highly-reliable connectivity to the Internet of
Things. In many cases, the cybersecurity maturity of these
newly connected devices is low. The consequences of this
insecurity can be seen in the case of the Mirai IoT botnet,
which caused the largest recorded Distributed Denial of Ser-
vice (DDoS) attack on the Internet in 2016 [6].
To address these challenges, there are a number of defensive
measures that can be put in place. Nevertheless, given the
increasing sophistication of threat actors and the level of ex-
posure of critical systems, a responsive capability is essential.
It is important that an incident, such as a cyber-attack,
is detected as early as possible. In addition to detecting a
challenge, it is important to be able to determine the root
cause of an incident so that effective mitigation actions can
be taken. This requires situational awareness [33], which can
be obtained through the use of various monitoring and de-
tection systems. Moreover, contextual information, regarding
a system’s environment, can be used to support situational
awareness. For example, weather data can be used to provide
insights in the case of poor performance of wireless commu-
nication networks.
Having detected an incident, it has to be mitigated. Cur-
rently, this is usually a human-resource-intensive task, re-
quiring specialist operator support. However, as critical in-
frastructures increase in scale and complexity, and rely more
on interconnected digital and virtualized systems, automated
approaches will become necessary. In this context the aim of
mitigation is twofold: (i) to contain the effects of an incident,
such as a cyber-attack or fault; and (ii) to eradicate the root
cause of the problem. An example containment action is a
scheme to push-back network traffic that is associated with a
Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack.
In contrast to containment, eradication is concerned with
determining the root cause of an incident and removing it. For
cybersecurity this typically entails identifying affected systems
and removing malicious software. For other root causes this
may involve changing equipment or system designs. For some
challenges eradication may for various reasons not be possible.
Examples include resource (financial) limitations, operational
availability requirements (eradication can involve taking sys-
tems offline) and inherent design limitations (e.g., one cannot
completely eradicate DoS attacks on the Internet). In this case,
the aim is to recover the system to a normal operational state
and to disengage any mitigation actions once a challenge has
abated.
B. Resilience and its Building Blocks
1) Resilience Strategy: Resilience is a familiar notion in
many walks of life – it is broadly considered as the ability to
’bounce back’ in or after difficult situations. Any strategy for
resilience will have a familiar set of steps that are basically
active (anticipation and preparedness) and reactive (detection
and mitigation). The resilience strategy [4] described in this
section provides guidance on the design and operation of a
resilient network (or networked system), applying principles
such as redundancy, diversity, and connectivity and associa-
tion. It captures the main components of the resilience process
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within an online and an off-line control loop expressed through
D2R2+DR as shown in Figure 2.
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Figure 2. D2R2+DR conceptual resilience model
The first part, i.e. D2R2 specifies a real-time control loop
defend, detect, remediate, recover. The centre of the circle
denotes structural defences such as geodiverse redundant
paths. The first part of the control loop consists of active
operational defences, for example filtering known attack signa-
tures. Should a challenge penetrate the system detection has to
identify and flag the threat. Remediation mechanisms are then
applied to ensure the best possible service during an ongoing
adverse event (such as a traffic attack) or after an event that
has destroyed parts of the infrastructure (such as a large-scale
disaster). For example, traffic may be rerouted around failed
infrastructure areas. Finally, recovery returns the network to
normal operations once the challenge has ended and failed
infrastructure elements have been repaired. This control loop
operates in across all components and in all network protocols.
The outer DR diagnose and refinement loop represents a
non-real-time control loop through which the resilience related
infrastructure aspects as well as the operational strategies are
analysed and improved, reflecting the longer-term experiences
and developments within the environment.
The D2R2+DR conceptual resilience model provides design
guidance, but is not an architectural blueprint. Within this
model, different aspects as part of an overall resilience ar-
chitecture have been addressed. It has also been shown that it
can address resilience in a cloud networked system [34].
The model considers the resilience properties as introduced
in [4]. It is important to note that this resilience model is
based on the concept of autonomic components that have large
degrees of self-organisation. These autonomic components are
not only adaptable to the environment but can also evolve. Col-
laboration between them largely happens through information
exchange and the adoption of joint policies and rule sets.
This model can be applied to individual, autonomic re-
silience instances, but can also be extended to apply to the
networked system level, where there is a set of interconnected
autonomic managers within one administrative domain.
A process for building resilient computer networks and
the set of steps involved has also been derived by other
research groups and standards bodies. A more or less common
understanding has emerged of the life cycle of resilience,
including the D2R2+DR model, and a NIST version that can
be summarized as follows: identify; protect; detect; respond;
and recover [35]. More recent research [3] has clarified the
need for a number of sub-steps. For example, related to the
D2R2+DR model, risk assessment needs to be involved in
defend, instrumentation of the system under inspection in
detect, and the need to move towards an enhanced system
state (taking account of the challenge and its adverse effects
on the system) in recover. For the outer loop of the D2R2+DR
approach, the diagnose and refine phases will probably require
human intervention [3], unless it can be made autonomic.
2) Interactions and Policies: Policy-based management
(PBM) has been proposed as one of the means for instantiating
appropriate resilience mechanisms and for defining their be-
haviour within the D2R2+DR control loop [36]. Policies can
be defined as rules governing the choices in behaviour of a
system [37]. Policies provide a useful abstraction to encode
choices that must be made when a range of mechanisms can
be used to realise a particular phase of D2R2+DR, or when
trade-offs must be considered in the decision-making process
(e.g. to deploy a more lightweight detection mechanism that
has lower accuracy, or a more accurate but heavyweight one).
Further, as more information about an ongoing challenge is
gathered, policies can modify the configuration of resilience
mechanisms deployed in the network, e.g. by applying a more
targeted remediation strategy.
Previous work [38] has assessed how PBM could be used
to realise resilience strategies to combat different types of
challenges and network anomalies. Figure 3 shows the interac-
tion between a number of mechanisms that cooperate through
policies to contain a volume-based DDoS attack. Initially,
it is assumed that a link monitor component (configured
via policies) is able to tell simply whether the incoming
traffic rate on a particular link is too high. In this case, a
preventive rate limiting of the link is triggered. Further, an
anomaly detection component is configured, also via policies,
to identify the destination IP address of the victim. As a
result, policies start shaping only traffic destined to the victim’s
IP address – legitimate traffic not destined for the victim,
which previously was blocked, is now allowed to go through.
A final step, also configured via policies, activates a traffic
classification component, which more precisely identifies the
malicious flows; rate limiting is confined just to the attack
flows, whereas legitimate traffic can continue. By having the
interactions between the mechanisms implemented with poli-
cies, one can easily change the strategy by adding or removing
the corresponding policies. Similar resilience strategies have
been applied to other challenges, such as to the detection and
mitigation of worm propagations [39].
We argue that policy-based frameworks can be seen as
enablers of autonomic computing and self-management. The
Self-Managed Cell (SMC) framework [40] provides an infras-
tructure for engineering autonomous systems. An SMC is the
building block component, which relies on the use of a policy-
driven control-loop to determine the kind of management
actions that should be performed in response to changes in
the SMC context.
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Figure 3. Policy-based DDoS resilience strategy [39]
3) Autonomic, Self-organised Adaptation: Another alter-
native is to return to Dijkstra’s original position on self-
stabilising systems and develop algorithms that are inherently
self-stabilising or self-restoring in the presence of localised
failures. A good example of this can be seen in the work
of Zambonelli, Viroli, Beal, Pianini, and their collaborators
on building computational fields and other distributed spatial
structures [41], [42]. Neighbourhood interactions can be used
to create gradient structures to route data and perform “in-
passing” computations. Such approaches allow to build a range
of systems that self-stabilise and reconfigure as the underlying
network is challenged, for example by node failure or mobility.
The techniques can also provide a substrate for exploring
location- or topology-dependent processes that are specified
as global functions and then decomposed onto the spatial
structure (cf. [43]).
Clearly it is not possible to damage such structures arbitrar-
ily and expect them to retain their functionality, at the very
least, for instance, network partitions destroy convergence.
Accepting these caveats, however, the advantage of such
“aggregate” programming approaches [44] is that they allow
low-level mechanisms to be treated as building blocks that can
be reasoned over as to the correctness and robustness of the
aggregate under stress.
4) Structural Resilience through Self-adaptation: Achiev-
ing system resilience through the structural design of its
component parts is not only appealing but is a rather obvious
idea. This has been around for a very long time in high-
availability systems such as in aerospace where techniques of
redundancy, hot standby components, and spatial diversity are
widely adopted.
Triple modular redundancy (TMR), for example, was used
from early days to improve computer reliability [45]. This
method was also applied in space shuttles where the concept of
diversity was realised using different software implementations
for modular elements in order to avoid the same software bug
affecting all operations. Literature in this area is abundant,
for example Shooman’s 2002 work on Reliability of Com-
puter Systems and Networks: Fault Tolerance, Analysis, and
Design [46].
Digital system design is mainly about structure in both
theory and practice. There are various abstract representations
of systems including Finite State Machines (FSMs), which
have inputs, outputs, internal state, and a specific function that
the machine is intended to carry out. This also encompassed
the idea of a hierarchy of systems and sub-systems, where an
FSM can equally well represent an entire system, one of its
sub-systems, or even one of its smallest elements.
As described above, the Internet’s original design provides
some degree of resilience. However, the designed topology of a
network (e.g. full mesh, star or some other structure) crucially
impacts on the resilience of the system with respect to multiple
or even single failures of nodes or links. If there is a critical
point of failure (such as the central node in a star topology)
the entire system may stop working if this component fails.
It is possible to compare the resilience of different network
topologies as in Jabbar [47], who proposes a framework to
quantify network resilience and survivability.
Modern practice suggests carrying out a risk assessment
before choosing the appropriate structure to meet the desired
resilience. Of course, there will typically be costs involved
in such a decision; more redundancy implies more expense.
However, such a “static” approach may not work well in
practice, and it may be appropriate to consider some form
of self-adaptation that would enable a system to re-configure
itself (resp. its structure) during operation, in particular in the
face of structural challenges. TMR is a specific example of
a “dynamic” approach, i.e. if one (of the three) components
goes wrong, its output will be different from the other two,
which will outvote and remove it.
Internet routing and domain naming systems can also re-
configure themselves when a failure is observed in one of the
elements. In this case re-configuration time may be long, and
one of the design criteria will be to minimise this time.
5) Situational Awareness: In order to make adaptations to
a running system, for example in response to the need for
additional resources to be deployed, or because of an identified
challenge or threat, it may be appropriate to use situational
information. This is particularly important in the context of
Operational Resilience where in the detection phase a whole
range of data and information has to be considered to ensure
an appropriate response.
Situational awareness (SA) has long been used in military
systems as an essential part of understanding the environment
in which the system is operating. Another term for this sort
of activity is context awareness. The need for this became
particularly apparent during research on network resilience1.
During the detect phase in the D2R2+DR model the focus is
on network traffic in order to identify anomalies, which then
leads into the remediation phase with the intention to bring the
system back to normal (or at least towards normal). However,
anomalous behaviour can be caused by a large variety of
challenges where the effects of several of these could look
the same. Thus the choice of remediation method (typically
some form of traffic engineering) may end up being based on
the symptoms of a challenge rather than knowing from where
1ResumeNet project: http://www.resumenet.eu
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the challenge originated or indeed its nature. In order to ensure
the appropriate form of remediation a root cause analysis
is required. Unfortunately, this is something that typically
takes time and is more suited to an offline analysis. Since
one of the ultimate goals of the strategy is to support real-
time operation and adaptation, the use of context information
providing insights about the external conditions (i.e. external
to the network itself) that have contributed to the challenge that
has led to the anomaly is required. The context depends on the
application or service that the system is underpinning. Thus,
a source of useful information can be as varied and different
as weather reports, environmental conditions as measured by
sensors, any relevant newsfeeds (whether local, regional or
broader), or indeed information from relevant social networks.
Situational Awareness provides a similar sort of information
base, although it was not originally intended for use in the
specific case of resilience, but rather to provide and maintain
an outlook for whatever use would be appropriate. One area
of possible interest would be building and maintaining a SA
city database that can be queried by various applications –
including ones that try to keep an eye on resilience, e.g. as
proposed in standards for cities2). SA can also be used to
enhance the D2R2+DR model with a predictive element based
on a history of previous events. Such prediction in resilient
systems operation might prove useful if expensive to provide,
and it would require machine learning. This is one of the
not yet fully explored elements of the DR outer loop of the
resilience model.
The engineering of realistic resilience assurance engines
in networks and networked systems has barely begun and
requires use cases and experiments such as identified in [48].
C. Towards Networked System Resilience: Self-organisation
and Functional Adaptation
1) ANA and Autonomic Networking: The Autonomic Net-
working Architecture (ANA) project was a European funded
project that researched the principles underpinning autonomic
networking and proposed a generic architectural framework
that enables autonomic communication at all levels [16].
Central to the ANA framework are abstractions that model
network operations, rather than defining protocols or protocol
functions [49]. These are namely Compartments (i.e. “regions”
of the network that are homogeneous in terms of their function,
spatial and/or temporal extent), Information Channels - IC (i.e.
defining available communication services, e.g. unicast, multi-
cast, broadcast and anycast, and their properties, e.g. reliability,
QoS, etc.), Functional Blocks – FB (i.e. protocol entities gener-
ating, consuming, processing and forwarding information) and
Information Dispatch Points - IDP (i.e. the interfaces through
which FBs can be accessed and communicate with). Figure 4
shows the fundamental ANA abstractions [49].
The concept of Functional Composition (FC) [50] as used
in ANA is an essential element for a flexible network sub-
system that enables autonomic behaviour since it provides the
“machinery” for adaptation. Functional Composition is not
only used to provide different services and various service
2ISO standards: https://www.iso.org/news/ref2305
Figure 4. Fundamental ANA abstractions [49]
qualities but is also needed to customise and adapt the com-
munication structure. Hence, Functional Composition provides
the building blocks for the realisation of self-organisation, self-
optimisation and self-healing properties within an autonomic
network architecture. A framework that enables dynamic com-
position of functionality to leverage autonomic behaviour has
been developed and evaluated in ANA through a prototype
user space implementation [50]. The adaptation supported
by Functional Composition can influence behavioural and
structural adaptation. The former allows immediate reaction to
changes in the environment as well as evolutionary adaptation
whereas the latter is more in support of long-term adaptation.
In order to provide network resilience within ANA a
monitoring architecture was developed providing monitoring
and environmental awareness through a service used by all
Functional Blocks that need knowledge about the network
state [51]. The monitoring service makes full use of the ANA
abstractions, and the ANA monitoring architecture allows the
dynamic placement of monitoring components as well as
changing the monitoring functionality during run-time (e.g.
to adapt to the monitoring requirements of new threats).
Using monitoring in conjunction with the ANA abstractions
and Functional Composition allows for fully integrated Opera-
tional Resilience by building anomaly detection on top of the
monitoring framework, and remediation and recovery func-
tionality using Functional Composition within a Resilience
Compartment. Structural Resilience can be implemented as
distributed functionality that is invoked during network for-
mation and adaptation, which may be required in order to
meet defined resilience targets. Hence, ANA laid some of
the groundwork for resilient networking through the use of
autonomic network principles with self-management, self-
organisation and self-adaptation as core concepts.
2) Programmable Networks: The limitations of inflexible
rigid network protocols and operation were recognised in the
late 1980s in the Internet and PSTN (public-switched tele-
phone network). Very different architectures emerged, which,
however, form the foundation of modern SDN (software de-
fined networking) and NFV (network function virtualisation).
Active networks began with the premise of considering what
could be done if Moore’s-law enabled processing were ex-
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ploited to provide additional functionality over the traditional
simple IP forwarding [52], [53]. A separate direction occurred
in the PSTN, motivated by telephony switch vendors and
service providers wishing the ability to provision new services
(initially such as teleconferencing and reverse billing) without
modifying the switch hardware. This was integrated into the
SS7 signalling network defined as IN (intelligent network)
capability sets [54]. IN functionality provided control-plane
programmability, including the ability to alter the behaviour
of the call state machine.
The re-emergence of programmable networking in the
2010s, generically referred to as software-defined networking
(SDN), promoted the broad adoption of programmability of the
control plane of computer networks. OpenFlow is the current
widespread implementation of SDN, providing programma-
bility of the control plane with a standard interface [55], and
standards now developed by the Open Network Foundation.
OpenFlow specifies a (logically) centralised controller that can
be used to program network functionality by installing entries
into switch flow tables that specify rules on which packet
actions can be taken. The logically centralised controller must
be physically distributed to provide resilience and scalability
for large networks. OpenFlow does not inherently support
control plane resilience, though research is in progress [56].
More recently POF (protocol-oblivious forwarding) [57]
and P4 (Programming Protocol-Independent Packet Proces-
sors) [58] have been introduced to add rich data-plane pro-
grammability into modern SDN routers and networks. These
efforts bring further opportunities to explore programmability
in the construction of a more resilient data plane.
3) Network Function Virtualisation (NFV): NFV is another
potentially fruitful direction for realizing resilient systems. The
European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI) has
been developing a set of proposals for exploiting virtualization
technologies to build telecommunications systems that have
a range of improved properties, including flexibility but also
resilience [59]. Future telecommunications systems will in
engineering terms consist of some key Physical Network
Functions (PNF) that cannot or should not be virtualized, while
everything else will be composed of Virtual Network Func-
tions (VNFs) that run on commodity hardware. These VNFs
(together with the relevant PNFs) will be composed to form a
network service and/or application. This is facilitated through
an orchestrator using some sort of user intent statement in
conjunction with appropriate policies to instruct how the VNFs
(and PNFs) will be chained together [60]. This is work in
progress and the two crucial aspects are: (i) the construction
of the chain to be suitably resilient (resilience by design); and
(ii) to monitor (and control) the resulting system so that it can
cope with the various challenges that will inevitably come its
way (e.g. apply the D2R2+DR model to the system).
Figure 5 illustrates the composition of virtualized network
functions into service function chains (SFCs). Individual VNFs
are mapped to NFV infrastructure points of presence (NFVI-
PoPs). Further, two SFCs demonstrate the composition of
VNFs to provide a specific service. The role of the NFV
architecture for the support of system resilience is twofold, i.e.
allowing (i) the migration and placement of virtual functions
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Figure 5. VNF service function chaining and systems resilience
into alternative NFVI-PoPs in case of hardware failure, and (ii)
to replace a failed VNF in an SFC (e.g., VNF2 in Figure 5) by
another VNF dynamically downloaded from a VNF repository.
Interest in autonomic operation goes back quite some
years, including notably the as-yet-unfulfilled aspiration of
autonomic network (and services) management [61], [62].
Telecommunications operators wish to reduce the very large
cost burden of OSS/BSS, and have been interested in ways
of achieving this for decades. NFV is a potentially important
driving force in this context.
IV. OPEN CHALLENGES AND RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
Numerous research challenges still exist within the resilient
networked systems space. On the one hand they are related
to technical aspects within the fields of networking, resilience
and self-organisation. On the other hand the systems aspect,
the human factors and role of people within the overall
system context are crucial and have long been neglected.
In this section we review these factors in order to form a
more comprehensive view on the directions research in this
field should take. The following subsections discuss each
research area in detail, while Table I highlights key points
and summarizes the impact of each area on systems resilience,
either positively (+) or negatively (−).
A. Intent-based Networking
Specifying complex resilience configurations may demand
the composition of a range of detection and mitigation mech-
anisms. Even though policy frameworks can be used to spec-
ify management policies to control the operation of these
resilience mechanisms, such low-level policies still have to
be manually specified by a human administrator. Complex
scenarios that for instance require the co-operation of a large
number of resilience mechanisms make deriving concrete poli-
cies by hand intractable. Alternatively it would be desirable to
(semi-)automatically derive strategies of implementable policy
configurations from high-level specifications and requirements
with minimum human involvement. Techniques for refining
high-level goals into concrete policy specifications have been
investigated for several years [63], [64], [65], [66]. These
typically employ some form of reasoning or decomposition
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Table I
KEY FINDINGS OBSERVED ABOUT THE OPEN RESEARCH CHALLENGES ON SYSTEMS RESILIENCE
Research area Key aspects and potential impact on theory and practice of systems resilience
Intent-based networking (+) minimize effort in the specification of resilience requirements; (+) operator needs to specify what should be
achieved as opposed to how it should be achieved; (−) need to ensure that the produced resilience configurations
are consistent; (−) difficult to deal with conflicting requirements.
Network function virtualization (+) virtualization technology allows for resilience reconfigurations that can be enacted much faster; (+) reduced
capital expenditure (CAPEX) and operational expenditure (OPEX) since additional resilience functions can be
executed on commodity servers, as opposed to dedicated hardware; (−) need to rely on some form of dynamic
verification to avoid producing inconsistent/incompatible VNF chainings, or deployments in suboptimal locations.
Programmable self-organisation (+) better abstraction and composition of mechanisms for self-* and resilience; (+) improved reasoning about
system capabilities and behaviours; (−) over-abstraction may hide important details and prevent some calculations;
(−) remains difficult to specify the appropriate envelopes of correct behaviour.
Cyber-physical systems resilience (+) interaction between cyber and physical domains can improve critical infrastructures and service resilience;
(+) novel modelling approaches can measure the resilience of cyber-physical systems and improve their design;
(−) consequences of mitigation systems interacting in the cyber and physical domain are not well-understood; (−)
engineering approaches considering safety and security aspects of cyber-physical systems are immature.
Resilient systems design/operation;
people and their roles
(+) resilience techniques in design and operation increase overall system resilience; (+) people develop and provide
coping strategies when computing or communication systems fail; (−) resilience by design and in operation each
require careful attention to many procedural details; (−) user behavior is unpredictable and may be a major source
of problems.
to recursively transform high-level goals into more concrete
ones.
More recently, intent-based networking (IBN) has emerged
as a promising approach that can help operators and users in
the specification and translation of high-level goals. Intents
can be used to define what (as opposed to how) the network
should do. Intent-driven networking enables the network to
be configured according to the operators’ intentions, without
requiring them to specify low-level technical policies. Both
industry [67], [68] and academia [69], [70] have devoted
efforts to IBN. Although an intent can be seen as an abstract,
high-level policy used to operate a network, it also relies on
the use of cognitive/autonomic functions to map high-level
requests to low-level configurations and on programmable
networks (e.g., SDN, NFV) to facilitate resource deployment
and configuration. Intents could specify high-level security
and resilience objectives using a Controlled Natural Language
(CNL) as in [71]. To realise an intent it is needed (i) to
determine the set of both physical and virtualised resources
required to fulfil the high-level goal, and (ii) to instantiate and
configure the low-level information of the physical or virtual
components. In our opinion the technology is mature enough
to address these challenges. More specifically using cognitive
reasoning and learning can address the former, and network
control/data plane programmability the latter.
B. Resilience Research and Network Function Virtualisation
Recent interest and activity in Network Function Virtualisa-
tion (NFV) has renewed the prospect of automated and even
autonomic management and control. The difference between
these is that autonomic operation implies some form of (ma-
chine) learning. This is not necessarily novel and has been
proposed under various circumstances before. However, the
technology and engineered artifacts that are at our disposal
nowadays keep on improving. NFV, enabled by highly capable
virtualization technology, comes along at a time when it
is possible to construct highly flexible systems in software.
These will run on fast, low cost, commodity hardware with
an abundance of memory. Thus it should be more easily
feasible to build resilience-by-design systems with appropriate
numbers and location of redundant components according to
the system’s resilience specification, compared to previous
times when systems were based on more specialized, less
flexible, and costly hardware. Operational resilience based on
NFV should also be more feasible because of the possibil-
ity of lightweight monitoring software that can be used to
observe and detect anomalies and to automatically (if not au-
tonomically) remediate while updating the system’s resilience
knowledge base. Included in this process is the replacement
of failed VNF modules (see Figure 5) with the possibility
of minimal disruption to normal service. Maintenance of a
suitable QoS and Quality of Experience (QoE) for the system’s
users is the ultimate aim, though this remains very difficult to
achieve. Current research is targeted at building VNF-based
implementations and experimenting with them using relevant
use cases in which a range of challenges is introduced to
the system under test (e.g., the NG-CDI project3). There are
several research questions including, (i) what granularity of
VNFs should be used (should they be large, i.e. realising a
whole service, very basic, i.e. a micro-service, or somewhere
in between); (ii) should the structure (and granularity) of
VNFs be classified and standardised in order to assist the
service construction (chaining) process; and (iii) and how will
the complexity of typically large-scale, real-world systems be
handled at the design stage, not least when they involved
human users and operators (see also Section IV-E).
C. Programmable Self-organisation and Resilience
Self-organising systems have enormous potential for reduc-
ing the need for human intervention in both the operation and
final function of networks – and this is both a strength and
a weakness. Clearly, the ability of networks and the services
running over them to self-organise initially – and in response
to changes in their environment, function, load, and so forth
– is highly desirable and potentially makes systems far more
robust, responsive, and resilient than they would be if requiring
3http://www.ng-cdi.org
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human management. Equally clearly, removing humans from
the loop reduces oversight and the ability to intervene when
autonomic mechanisms fail – and at the current state of the
art it is more a case of when, and not if, such interventions
will be required.
One weakness of many current approaches is that it is
difficult to specify the desired behaviours (to exhibit and to
avoid) with sufficient precision and breadth for long-term
autonomic deployment. In most other branches of software
engineering such a priori specifications have been abandoned,
recognising that they often do not deliver regardless of the
care or technology. This being the case the questions are: (i)
How can we describe the “envelopes of behaviour” within
which systems should adapt? (ii) What constitutes “correct”
behaviour when “correct” is itself a complex function of
environment and user expectation?
A possible way to address these issues is to move towards
a more “self-organising by design” programming model. The
advantage is that the “plumbing” functions of self-organisation
and adaptation are moved out of the application domain and
into the infrastructure. This has numerous advantages, includ-
ing: allowing programmers to focus on service-level code,
unbundled from the mechanics of self-organisation; providing
richer programming abstractions for developing such service
logic; permitting higher-level reasoning about behaviour and
correctness; and supporting compositionality and other fea-
tures needed for scaling-out services.
Whether there exists a set of abstractions that will support
these features over a broad class of application domains
remains an open question and almost every aspect remains an
active subject of research. It is not clear, for example, whether
self-* properties can be added incrementally to existing service
architectures and ecosystems, or whether new services must
be developed ex nihilo, with all the costs and difficulties this
would imply: clearly incremental deployment would be both
more cost-effective and more likely to preserve existing correct
behaviour.
Self-organisation by design is not the same as resilience by
design. Resilience is one self-* property among many, needing
to be specified precisely and then integrated with (and/or
traded off against) others. One might approach this problem by
trying to find a collection of inherently resilient programming
abstractions, for instance aggregate programming provides a
practical implementation of a theory of resilient computational
fields [41], [72] (see Section III-B3 and several other similar
examples). However, it is possible that the very act of ab-
stracting one aspect of self-management, while simplifying
construction and reasoning in another aspect of a system,
complicates those processes throughout. Computational fields
make few if any guarantees about timely adaptation and
mask the mechanisms that might allow one to estimate key
properties (e.g., stabilisation time after disruption). This may
be a trade-off worth making for some applications, but not for
others.
It is also worth observing that many (although not all) rich
programming models come at a further cost of reduced per-
formance and increased resource utilisation. In networks, the
resource being consumed is often bandwidth, and the costs can
be prohibitive for some applications. Wireless sensor networks,
for example, would benefit hugely from self-stabilising and
resilient communications provided generically, but typically
cannot support the extra communications this entails given
that the extra messages also consume power. One is therefore
often reduced to manual optimisation and convoluted design
even when a better solution is, in some sense, readily available.
D. Cyber-physical Systems Resilience
Societally critical systems are in the process of being
digitalised. In many cases they are cyber-physical systems (and
systems of systems) wherein a combination of cyber compo-
nents (including communication networks) and control algo-
rithms are used to manage a physical process or system [73].
Examples of cyber-physical systems include autonomous ve-
hicles, industrial plants, and electricity distribution systems.
Previous research has investigated the effects that per-
turbations in the cyber domain, e.g., caused by unreliable
communication networks or cyber-attacks can have on an
algorithm’s ability to control a physical system (e.g., instabil-
ities can occur) [74]. Therefore, it is important to understand
and measure the relationships between the cyber, control and
physical domains to derive self-organising system designs that
are resilient. A resilience metric framework has been proposed
that can be used to explore these interdependencies and
examine the resilience of a cyber-physical system [75]. This
involves modelling the relationships between the domains and
acknowledges that reduced performance in one domain, e.g.,
increased network delay that is caused by a Denial of Service
(DoS) attack, can result in a challenge to another – the ability
for a system to be controlled. This concept is exemplified in
Figure 6, which shows an example of a power system. The
measurement framework can provide useful insights at design
time, e.g., by modelling a system’s performance. However,
the modelling process is – from an application perspective –
rather complicated, and future research needs to be carried out
to determine the benefits of such an approach to others that
do not aim to model these interdependencies [76].
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Figure 6. Challenges and performance measures with respect to the cyber-
physical system domains for a power systems example. A DoS attack in the
cyber domain, along with a load change, can result in phase and frequency
errors, and poor settling times in the control domain [75].
Resilient control schemes have been developed to improve
the robustness of control systems to various challenges, includ-
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ing faults and cyber-attacks. In general, control systems are
designed to be resilient to missing or erroneous measurements
from field devices that are, for instance, caused by component
failures. State estimation algorithms are typically used to infer
a system’s state in these circumstances [77].
Recent research has investigated how industrial control
systems can be made resilient to cyber-attacks [78]. In this
work, the authors present a scheme that combines an anomaly
detection system (using measurements taken from a physical
process) with a resilient control scheme to mitigate the effects
of data manipulation attacks to a heating system that uses a
water boiler. The aim of the research is to examine whether
resilient control decisions could be improved, i.e., be more
appropriate, with knowledge of the presence of a cyber-attack.
Similar schemes have been proposed for use in electricity
substations [79].
This avenue of research has the potential to improve the
resilience of cyber-physical systems, enabling automatic adap-
tation of a system to different forms of challenges, including
cyber-attacks. However, there are several concerns that need
to be addressed. For instance, the resilient control schemes
make the system less controllable (e.g., by introducing a delay
before telecontrol commands are applied). This behaviour is
desirable, as it can make the system more stable if it is
being manipulated by an attacker. Unfortunately, such schemes
could also reduce the controllability of a system because of
false positives from detection systems or as a consequence of
the schemes themselves being targeted by an attacker. This
is highly problematic for safety-critical systems. Therefore,
research is needed into when such schemes can be applied
and systematic design guides, e.g., reference architectures, that
support their application.
E. Resilient Systems Design and Operation
As has been discussed, resilient systems and applications
must continue to offer an acceptable level of service, what-
ever the nature of the challenge or hazard. Applications that
(will) need to be resilient include industrial control systems
(ICS), Internet of Things (IoT) networks that support health
care, and future networks that support autonomous vehicles
in future Smart Cities. There are many other cases where
communication systems provide the underpinning for critical
infrastructures or services. In all of these humans form an
integral part of the overall system alongside the core technical
elements. This applies to all stages of the system design and
implementation, and usually also in their operation. Many
issues still need to be investigated and solved in order to build
successful and cost-effective resilient systems.
1) Architecture and Realisation: The architecture and the
realisation of resilience are far from being mature, despite
prior work that sheds understanding on the principles of
resilience [4], as previously described in this paper.
In-principle questions remain, notably how to specify re-
silience in a way that systems can be engineered to have the
right properties. How resilient services can be composed from
a Service Level Agreement (SLA) that describes the desired
level of resilience is still unsolved. Further questions are, for
example: (i) What granularity of resilience is implied by the
specification; is the entity under consideration a service, a sub-
system, or the entire system? (ii) What classes of resilience are
to be indicated in the SLA; should it be (near to) 100 percent,
should it be best-effort, or something in between? (iii) How
would the SLA be monitored and, more significantly, how
would it be enforced? Yet another issue is what would be the
consequence of violating the SLA for the service provider, e.g.
would this be in financial or legal terms, or both?
While techniques have been developed to analyse and quan-
tify the network resilience in terms of topological robustness
to attacks and disasters, as well as a static state-space analysis
for user service level vs. network operational state, much more
work needs to be done. For example, in the Collaborative
Research Centre MAKI (Multi-Mechanisms Adaptation for the
Future Internet) adaptive monitoring in a mobile environment
has been investigated [80]. A monitoring service that executes
transitions between distinct monitoring mechanisms has been
developed to adapt to dynamic network conditions [81]. This
shows how the mechanisms and services that resilience builds
on can also adjust depending on the prevailing conditions, in
addition to self-organisation and adaptation in response to re-
silience challenges. Analysis of MANETs, in which the topol-
ogy is dynamically changing, shows that future topologies are
generally unpredictable [82]. In this case the self-organising
nature includes self-repair as the network automatically repairs
failed nodes. However, temporal analysis that considers the
trade-off between severity and duration is needed (short–severe
vs. long–mild) [83]. Other issues are related to large complex
heterogeneous networks that challenge both graph-theoretic
analysis and simulation-based modelling For example, a Smart
City environment incorporating smart home, smart building,
vehicular, and 5G networking is extraordinarily complex, and
challenges known analysis techniques [84].
2) People and their Roles: A fundamental issue is the in-
volvement of people in the operation of critical infrastructures.
People, their organisational roles and responsibilities, and their
behaviour, are crucial elements in these systems.
It is crucial to take a full and proper account of the various,
distinct roles of people in systems design and operation. This
issue has been studied in related disciplines such as Computer
Supported Cooperative Work (CSCW) and Human Computer
Interaction (HCI), involving alongside computer scientists.
Also, the roles of people in systems have been previously
investigated in principle and practice by Checkland and oth-
ers [85]. Their work recognised the important but extremely
difficult-to-model role of humans within organisations and the
systems of which they are an intrinsic part. Also, the work
of Woods and Hollnagel has added significantly to the theory
and practice of resilient systems [86].
Despite the considerable work that has been carried out in
this area in the past, it is worth revisiting the issue of people.
This is especially so since the goals have changed with the new
focus on designing and building natively resilient systems, in
spite of the inevitable presence of people at many if not all
stages of their design and operation. There is no doubt that
the presence of people, with all their frailties, can be a major
source of problems. However, individuals and groups can also
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be a source of strength, not least when it comes to coping
strategies and applying their intelligence in situations where
machines have failed or unanticipated problems have arisen.
People may be categorised as owners, policy makers, de-
signers, implementers, operators, or users. These roles reflect
the viewpoint from which the person sees the system in
question. Of these, the designers and implementers are the
only ones who can influence the ‘internals’ of the system; all
others will essentially see the system as a ‘black box’ with its
inputs and outputs.
One of the issues that arise is whether or to what extent
people can be omitted or merely sidelined in the interactions
they have with the system. For design and implementation this
is extremely difficult as people have to be involved in gathering
requirements and are (still) the origins of designs, although
programming can to some extent be automated. The question
of automation at the operator or user levels is perhaps the
one most visited in the past. However, it is one that may still
arouse the most controversy, not least over safety concerns,
as well as fears around loss of employment. Further research
also needs to deal with the influence and impact of humans
as system owners, operators, and policy makers.
From this arises the fundamental research question: whether
the behaviour of humans in their interactions with systems
can be properly modelled. Can, for instance, people be simply
represented as components of systems with appropriate prop-
erties and risks assigned to them? Should they be represented
in some sort of statistical way, or can their roles (at least in
some circumstances) be constrained in such a way that their
behaviour is more deterministic – perhaps by the application
of rules and checks [87], [88].
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Resilience needs to be an inherent property of networked
systems in order to maintain a good service while withstanding
attacks or dealing with other adverse events. Increasingly,
networked systems are deployed in mobile and highly dy-
namic environments (e.g. in a smart city, collaborative au-
tonomous driving, or digital health context). Further, they
control more and more critical infrastructure elements. Within
these use cases different system parts have a high degree of
autonomicity; thus self-organisation is the most appropriate
way of allowing systems to form and re-form. In resilience
research it was acknowledged early on that self-* properties
can help ensure that a satisfactory level of service can be
maintained and that challenges can be dealt with appropriately.
This is for instance reflected in the D2R2 model and the
policy-based resilience research that uses self-management
and self-organisation to adapt to challenges. We conclude that
resilience cannot properly be provided as an add-on but that
networked systems require resilience by design, making use of
autonomic principles throughout the entire resilience process.
In this paper we have argued that self-organisation is
essential within elements of the resilience ecosystem, such as
an adaptive monitoring infrastructure. Thus mechanisms and
services that resilience relies on can also adjust depending
on the prevailing conditions, in addition to self-organisation
and adaptation in response to resilience challenges. However,
self-organisation poses challenges in itself since the behaviour
of system components can be less predictable, which makes
detection and mitigation more difficult.
An aspect we have highlighted that requires urgent attention
is the behaviour of humans who interact with networked
systems, including system operators employed within the
relevant organisations. Humans are participants within the
system context, and their behaviour has to be taken into
account when designing resilient solutions. The modelling of
people, and potentially their replacement by self-organising
system elements, are crucial aspects in ensuring the resilience
of future networked systems.
Finally, apart from the specific technical aspects addressed
in this paper, it is essential to consider the overall system and
its context, i.e. systems thinking is required from the design
phase onwards in order to ensure coordinated resilience across
all layers and elements in networked systems.
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